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Path: sserve!newshost.anu.edu.au!munnari.oz.au!news.Hawaii.Edu!ames!haven.umd.edu!umd5.umd.edu!roissy.umd.edu!mark From: mark@roissy.umd.edu (Mark Sienkiewicz) Newsgroups: comp.os.386bsd.development Subject: Re: A challenge to all true hackers: objects and types Date: 29 Mar 1993 20:39:28 GMT Organization: University of Maryland Lines: 21 Message-ID: <1p7mq0$fot@umd5.umd.edu> References: <ARNEJ.93Mar24113744@chanur.imf.unit.no> <C4FEo2.8no@sugar.neosoft.com> <1993Mar27.081223.2547@fcom.cc.utah.edu> NNTP-Posting-Host: roissy.umd.edu In article <1993Mar27.081223.2547@fcom.cc.utah.edu> terry@cs.weber.edu (A Wizard of Earth C) writes: >In article <C4FEo2.8no@sugar.neosoft.com> peter@NeoSoft.com (Peter da Silva) writes: >>I think that's a reasonable conclusion. How about variant links using >>some other set of per-process/per-uid symbolic name space? > >As I pointed out in the previous post, this is based on the bad assumption >that a process may modify it's own environment or that of it's parent, both >of which are not allowed. Shells need to modify their own environment, or else this unfortunate example will come true: % mkdir foo % echo hello > foo/xxx % ln -s '$XXX/xxx' thefile % setenv XXX foo % cat thefile "cat" opens the file hello % cat < thefile "csh" opens the file cat: cannot open thefile: No such file or directory